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Abstract 8	  
The study evaluated the performance of passive surveillance in commercial and backyard chickens for 9	  
HPAI H5N1 in Bayelsa state, Nigeria, using scenario tree modelling. A scenario tree model for passive 10	  
surveillance was developed and simulated to estimate the sensitivity, i.e. the probability of detecting one 11	  
or more diseased chicken farms at different levels of disease prevalence. The model showed a median 12	  
sensitivity of 100%, 50% and 19% for detecting HPAI by passive surveillance assuming the entire 13	  
reference population was under surveillance at a design prevalence of 0.1%, a minimum of 10 and 3 14	  
infected poultry farms respectively. When 35% of the reference population was under surveillance, the 15	  
sensitivity of passive surveillance was 98%, 22% and 7% at a design prevalence of 0.1%, a minimum of 16	  
10 and 3 infected poultry farms respectively. The probability of detecting HPAI changed drastically when 17	  
the proportion of backyard poultry farmers who reported suspected cases to the government or a private 18	  
veterinarian varied from 3% to 26%. Parameters with the most significant contribution to the sensitivity 19	  
of the surveillance program are; the ability of backyard poultry farmers to recognise HPAI; and their 20	  
willingness to report suspected cases of the disease. Increasing the proportion of the population involved 21	  
in passive surveillance; encouraging the reporting of suspected cases through enlightenment campaigns; 22	  
compensation payment to poultry farmers for culled birds; and improving the communication channels 23	  
between all relevant stakeholders is crucial to the detection process. 24	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Introduction 27	  
Outbreaks of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) are of notable concern because of its adverse 28	  
impacts on public health, the poultry industry as well as the economy of affected nations. A total of 606 29	  
confirmed human cases of Avian Influenza (AI) infection with 357 deaths (WHO, 2012) have been 30	  
reported, most of which are linked with exposure to sick or dead poultry (WHO, 2011).  Outbreaks of AI 31	  
do not only devastate the poultry industry through the high mortality and morbidity of the disease or 32	  
depopulation for controlling the outbreaks, but also cause a drop in demand for poultry and poultry 33	  
products through negative market reactions. A typical case point in Africa is the outbreak of Highly 34	  
Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5N1 in Nigeria which reduced the demand and consumption of 35	  
poultry products and led to a loss of jobs for poultry farmers. 36	  
Prior to the HPAI H5N1 outbreak in Nigeria, the poultry population was estimated at 150 million birds, 37	  
25% produced commercially, 15% semi-commercially and 60% backyard poultry (Ortiz et al, 2007). 38	  
Poultry production is an important economic activity in Nigeria and is a significant constituent of family 39	  
income especially in poor rural communities (CBN, 2004). It employs two-third of the nation’s labour 40	  
force (Ugwu, 2009). Backyard poultry is kept extensively throughout the country (Uzochukwu-Obi et al, 41	  
2008) and serves as a source of quick cash, food security and ultimately forms part of the peoples’ 42	  
livelihood (Diao et al, 2009).  43	  
The first case of HPAI H5N1 in Nigeria was detected on a commercial poultry farm in Kaduna state, on 44	  
the 26 of January 2006 (Joannis et al, 2006; De Benedictis et al, 2007). The disease spread across 25 of 45	  
the 36 states in the country between January 2006 and July 2008 (Fusaro et al, 2009), affecting both 46	  
commercial and backyard poultry (Fasina et al, 2011). By January 2007 the first and only human case of 47	  
HPAI was confirmed in Lagos state (WHO, 2012). 48	  
An estimated 1.3 million birds died or were culled in an attempt to control the outbreak in Nigeria 49	  
(Fasina et al, 2011). Eighty percent reduction in the consumption of poultry in households and restaurants 50	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was reported during the outbreak in 2006 (Anon, 2006; Obayelu, 2007). Surveys conducted across 51	  
poultry farms showed that 80% of workers of affected farms and 45% of un-­‐affected farms had lost their 52	  
jobs due to lower revenue during HPAI outbreak (Anon, 2006; Obayelu, 2007) 53	  
Efforts were made by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) in collaboration with several 54	  
international bodies including the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), the 55	  
World Bank, the World Organisation for Animal health (OIE) and others to intensify surveillance and 56	  
control the outbreak (Joannis et al, 2008). Control measures included; active surveillance in farms and 57	  
Live Bird Markets (LBM), restriction of bird movements throughout the country, enlightenment of 58	  
poultry farmers on the significance of bio-security, thorough decontamination of infected premises and 59	  
rapid stamping out of all laboratory confirmed cases (Ekong et al, 2012). Confirmation of a farm positive 60	  
for HPAI H5N1 within a village led to all birds within that village being culled (Henning et al., 2012). 61	  
Passive surveillance or the reporting of suspected cases of AI to the veterinary authorities was set up in 62	  
2006 with the aim of optimizing rapid detection of the disease. A compensation payment scheme for 63	  
culled birds was introduced and later revised to encourage poultry farmers report suspected cases 64	  
(Akinwumi et al, 2010) and minimize consumption or sale of sick birds in order to ease direct losses due 65	  
to the disease (Otte et al, 2008; Anon, 2006)  66	  
There have been no reported cases of HPAI in Nigeria since 2008 (OIE, 2012). The technical assistance 67	  
and financial support from international organizations related to this issue ended in May 2011 (World 68	  
Bank, 2012). Nevertheless the Nigerian government would still need to re-consider and modify its 69	  
control and prevention strategies for HPAI. It needs an evaluation of surveillance systems in order to 70	  
optimize its efficiency.  71	  
With regards to surveillance, sensitivity is the probability that at least one bird infected with HPAI will 72	  
be detected by the surveillance system, provided the disease is present in the reference population at or 73	  
above a specified level of prevalence (Martin et al, 2007). This study aims to evaluate the sensitivity of 74	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the passive surveillance for HPAI, using Bayelsa state in the southern region of Nigeria (See Fig 1) as a 75	  
case study. Due to the presence of inland water bodies, its poultry density (122 poultry/Km2 of land area), 76	  
human population density (182 people/Km2) and market access, the state has been considered a high risk 77	  
area for the occurrence of HPAI (Uzochukwu-Obi et al, 2008).  78	  
The method used is scenario tree modelling described by Martin et al, (2007). The result obtained will 79	  
serve as a guide to refining the surveillance system design and improve the likelihood of disease 80	  
detection. The objectives of the study are: 81	  
- To quantitatively assess the sensitivity of passive surveillance for HPAI, H5N1 in Bayelsa state. 82	  
- To identify potential areas for improvement to the surveillance system. 83	  
Materials and Methods 84	  
A scenario tree model (STM) was developed to estimate the probability that passive surveillance for 85	  
HPAI H5N1 in Bayelsa would detect at least one diseased animal if present in the chicken population at 86	  
or above a stipulated design prevalence.  87	  
2.1. Reference population 88	  
Bayelsa state is located in southern Nigeria, within Latitude 40 15’ North, 50 23’ South and longitude 50 89	  
22’ West and 60 45’ East. The state is divided into eight (8) Local Government Areas (LGAs). According 90	  
to the National Bureau of Statistics, in 2007, there were 265,189 households in the state and a total of 91	  
1,147,432 poultry - almost all of which are chickens. The structure of poultry production systems is 92	  
similar to those in most developing countries; small number of large scale commercial poultry farms and 93	  
countless numbers of small scale backyard poultry farms. Due to lack of up-to-date census of poultry 94	  
farms in the state, data on the number of backyard poultry was based on  Uzochukwu-Obi et al’s, (2008) 95	  
report which stated that an estimated 64.42% of households in the region keep backyard poultry. With 96	  
this estimate and the total number of households in the state, it would give a total of 170,835 households 97	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having backyard chickens assuming there has been no significant change in the number of households in 98	  
the state (Uzochukwu-Obi et al, 2008; NBS 2007). Based on a 2006 census there were 64 registered 99	  
commercial poultry farms in Bayelsa of which 59 are exclusive chicken flocks (92%), four keep a 100	  
mixture of chickens and turkeys (6.2%) and one duck farm (1.5%). As majority of poultry in the state is 101	  
comprised of chickens and chickens constitute the greatest percentage (>80%) of the poultry industry in 102	  
Nigeria (Adene and Oguntade, 2008), this study therefore assesses the sensitivity of the passive 103	  
surveillance in the chicken population only. A surveillance unit for this analysis is poultry holding. 104	  
2.2. Surveillance System Components (SSC) based on passive surveillance 105	  
Passive surveillance is the voluntary reporting of HPAI by poultry farmers to the National Animal 106	  
Disease Information and Surveillance through their respective state veterinary services. Every state of 107	  
Nigeria has a Desk officer who heads the National Avian Influenza Control Project (NAICP). The desk 108	  
officer is in charge of HPAI surveillance and response activities in the state. Reporting of suspected cases 109	  
of AI is directed to him. Upon suspicion, the following samples are collected and sent to the National 110	  
Veterinary Research Institute (NVRI) by the government veterinarian; swabs of tracheal and cloacal 111	  
contents taken aseptically, brain, trachea, spleen and intestinal contents. Specimens are taken from at 112	  
least six birds preferably with an equal number of dead birds and those showing signs of acute disease 113	  
(FDLPCS, 2006). These samples are pooled and tested using RT-PCR. Positive samples are then subject 114	  
to Virus isolation. 115	  
2.3. Field study / Data sources 116	  
Of eight LGAs in Bayelsa state, two LGAs were purposively selected based on accessibility and 117	  
available funds; Yenegoa LGA and Ogbia LGA. The field study was carried out with the aim of 118	  
obtaining a holistic understanding of the characteristics of poultry farming in the state and peoples’ 119	  
behaviour in terms of disease reporting. We started by interviewing poultry famers and then moved 120	  
towards people who they reported to. In this process we developed an information pathway and 121	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subsequently drew the Scenario tree. The STM was populated based on data gained from questionnaire, 122	  
expert opinion and literature search. 123	  
2.3.1. Poultry farmers/ farm workers Interviews 124	  
Sampling of poultry farms was done using snowball sampling. Commercial and Backyard chicken flocks 125	  
first visited were based on the state veterinary services’ knowledge. Other poultry farmers were then 126	  
found through referral by the previous poultry farmers visited and distributors of poultry feed. This 127	  
sampling method was used due to lack of up-to-date official registration of poultry farms in Nigeria. 26 128	  
poultry farmers (13 commercial chicken farmers and 13 backyard chicken farmers) were interviewed 129	  
within the time available for the study. The interview gathered information on flock type, production 130	  
systems, demographics, husbandry practices, bio-security, feeding, and knowledge of poultry disease, 131	  
drug use, and reporting practices. The answers obtained from these interviews were incorporated in the 132	  
model. Table 2 shows the details of the probability distributions and proportions chosen for the scenario 133	  
tree model.  134	  
2.3.2. Interview of Private Vet Doctors and “Informal poultry health advisors” 135	  
Three categories of people who poultry farmers report to were identified;  136	  
i. A private veterinarian; 137	  
ii. An informal poultry health advisor; and 138	  
iii. The state veterinary service. 139	  
An informal poultry health advisor is one who knows about poultry and poultry disease, has years of 140	  
experience in the field, may be called a doctor but is actually not. He or she provides advice to poultry 141	  
farmers on matters of bird health and may be skilled to carry out post mortem examinations on birds. His 142	  
or her service is usually cheaper compared to private veterinarians. Two private veterinary doctors and 143	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two informal poultry health advisers were interviewed. Interviews were done to understand the process of 144	  
detection of an infected flock, diagnostic capability and communication channels with the state veterinary 145	  
service. 146	  
2.3.3. Expert Opinion 147	  
A number of parameters in the scenario tree model were estimated by expert opinion due to a lack of 148	  
published data. Four experts agreed to take part, experts selected possessed relatively equal levels of 149	  
expertise. Two were drawn from the NAICP, one from the University of Nigeria and one from the 150	  
National HPAI Reference Laboratory, NVIR. The median years of experience of the experts were 18 and 151	  
the average was 17.7. Experts were asked to respond giving a minimum, most likely and maximum value 152	  
to all scenarios presented. Individual responses were then combined by taking a simple average of their 153	  
opinions to provide single distributions for each parameter and incorporated as inputs of the pert 154	  
distribution in the model. Table 3 shows the details of the expert opinion elicitation process. 155	  
2.4. Scenario tree model (STM) 156	  
The structure of the scenario tree, the nodes and branches developed as a result of this study are shown in 157	  
Figure 2. The STM evaluates the performance of the disease detection process. It considers the key 158	  
factors that influence the probability of a positive surveillance outcome (Martin et al, 2007). The STM 159	  
displays a sequence of steps in the passive surveillance which is classified into category nodes, infection 160	  
nodes and detection nodes. The risk category node splits the scenario tree into branches for which the risk 161	  
of being infected differs. The infection node reflects the level of design prevalence chosen for the 162	  
analysis. Detection nodes reflect the events that precede detection by the passive surveillance. 163	  
2.4.1. Risk Category Nodes 164	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Based on farm type, one risk category node is considered in the STM. The branches are: commercial and 165	  
backyard chicken farms. The relative risk (RR) of infection between commercial and backyard chicken 166	  
flocks was derived from expert opinion.  167	  
2.4.2. Infection nodes 168	  
The disease prevalence is assigned at the among-flock level. Three among-flock level prevalence (P*H) 169	  
was considered in the analysis. 0.1%; 10 infected poultry farms and 3 infected poultry farms.  170	  
2.4.3. Detection nodes 171	  
The process of detection depends on the probability that an infected bird will show clinical signs (CS) 172	  
and the ability of the poultry farmer to recognize the infection (RG). Because HPAI H5N1 is associated 173	  
with high mortality and morbidity in chickens, we estimated a high probability of detection by most 174	  
commercial farmers. The chicken owner may not precisely identify the disease but can clearly recognize 175	  
a problem. For backyard chicken farms, where birds are less monitored, and in most cases are allowed to 176	  
roam and confined only at night, there is a possibility of the disease going undetected (Henning et al., 177	  
2008). We therefore generated a pert distribution using @Risk for this parameter.  178	  
The poultry farmer’s action (FA) after the disease is recognised is crucial and may be influenced by 179	  
certain important factors such as;  180	  
i. The farmer wants to avoid veterinary control for certain reasons;  181	  
ii. The farmer may be unable to contact the veterinarian to make a report as a result of very poorly 182	  
developed road network and lack of means of communication; or 183	  
iii. The absence of compensation payment for culled birds.  184	  
This parameter was assigned proportions based on the responses of backyard and commercial poultry 185	  
farmers interviewed.  Farmers’ actions were characterized into four possible outcomes as follows;  186	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i. Farmer consults a private veterinarian (FCpV); 187	  
ii. Farmer reports to the state veterinary service/government (FCG); 188	  
iii. Farmer consults a “informal poultry health advisor” (FCQ), and 189	  
iv. Farmer consults no one. 190	  
Table 4 shows data used to populate these outcomes.  191	  
All veterinarians are obligated to report (VR) suspicion to the State veterinary service (FDLPCS, 2006) 192	  
however the probability that an informal poultry health adviser would report (QR) is uncertain. This is 193	  
mainly because there are no formal government records to prove their existence; and these poultry health 194	  
advisers are not usually well known by the state veterinary service. Data on the probability of QR was 195	  
assigned by the author based on field study interviews with informal poultry advisers 196	  
The detection process further depends on the probability that the government veterinarian will take 197	  
samples at the suspected poultry farm (VS) and the probability that the national reference laboratory will 198	  
perform the test for HPAI (LT). The value assigned to these parameters may be influenced by economic 199	  
factors such as the availability of funding. Financial support provided by international organisations for 200	  
HPAI H5N1 surveillance has been suspended (World Bank 2011). Hence expert opinion elicitation 201	  
process was used to estimate the probability of the vet taking samples and the probability that submitted 202	  
samples will be tested by the national reference laboratory. The final steps are the probability of a 203	  
diseased animal testing positive to the diagnostic tests being used which are; Real-time RT-PCR (SePCR) 204	  
and Virus isolation (SeVI). These parameters were populated based on literature search and expert 205	  
opinion (Alba et al, 2010)  206	  
2.5. Model output 207	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A scenario tree of HPAI passive surveillance was developed using @Risk Version 5.7 (Palisade 208	  
Corporation) with Microsoft excel 2010. Model was run at 10,000 iterations. Taking into consideration 209	  
uncertainty and variability, probability distributions were used for some model parameters.  210	  
2.6. Estimating the sensitivity of passive SSC 211	  
2.6.1. Adjusted risk 212	  
The relative risk of infection between backyard and commercial chicken farms were adjusted to retain 213	  
relativeness while ensuring that the weighted risk for the population is equal to one (1) (Martin et al 214	  
2007) 215	  
    ARi =   (1) 216	  
ARi represents the adjusted relative risk and RRi represents the relative risk for the ith branch of the node. 217	  
PrPi is the proportion of the reference population for each branch and I is the number of branches. 218	  
2.6.2. Calculating the Effective Probability of Infection (EPIH) 219	  
The adjusted risk was used to calculate the EPIH for commercial and backyard chicken farms using the 220	  
following formula; 221	  
   EPIHi = ARi× P*H     (2) 222	  
P*H represents the disease prevalence at the among-farm level 223	  
The sensitivity of passive surveillance if HPAI were present at disease prevalence P*H, was estimated 224	  
using the following equation; 225	  
   CSepass = 1 – (1 – EPIHi × Sei) n   (3) 226	  
n is the number of flocks in the subpopulation of i; Sei is the probability of an infected chicken farm 227	  
being detected by the passive surveillance. Se is estimated by multiplying all detection nodes across the 228	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respective branches of the scenario tree as follows:   229	  
Sei = CS × RG × ((FCpV × PvR) + (FCQ × QR) + FCG) ×VS × LT ×SePCR × SeVI (4) 230	  
Results 231	  
3.1. Sensitivity of passive surveillance 232	  
The sensitivity of passive surveillance was estimated at three levels of disease prevalence; 0.1%, 10 233	  
infected poultry farms (0.00585%) and 3 infected poultry farms (0.0018%). The median, 5 and 95 234	  
percentiles of the distribution of the sensitivity of detection is displayed in table 5.  235	  
The results showed a 100% probability of detecting at least one HPAI infected farm assuming the disease 236	  
is present at a prevalence of 0.1%. However, the estimated median probability of detecting HPAI was 237	  
reduced to 50%, and 19% when reducing P*H to 10 and 3 infected farms respectively. 238	  
Table 6 shows the sensitivity of passive surveillance assuming only 35% of the reference population was 239	  
subject to passive surveillance, at a design prevalence of 0.1%, 10 and 3 infected holdings.  These results 240	  
show how the sensitivity of surveillance systems can be affected by the size of the reference population. 241	  
The probability of detection assuming 10 farms were infected reduced by over 50% 242	  
3.4. Important input parameters to the sensitivity of passive surveillance for HPAI 243	  
Results for the poultry farmers’ action following the recognition of clinical signs is shown in table 4. It 244	  
was common that suspected cases were not reported among backyard poultry farmers found in rural 245	  
settlements. Among the 26 poultry farms visited, higher probability of reporting suspected cases of HPAI 246	  
was significantly (p = 0.003) correlated with commercial poultry farms, r = 0.54, which can be 247	  
considered a large effect. Higher numbers of birds in a farm was also correlated with higher probability 248	  
of reporting suspected cases, r =0.30, which can be considered a medium effect.  249	  
r = (correlation coefficient) 250	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Sensitivity analysis of the effect of input parameters on the value of the output shows that the capability 253	  
of backyard poultry farmers to recognise and report the clinical signs of HPAI has a considerable impact 254	  
on the sensitivity of HPAI H5N1 passive surveillance. During the field study, 23% of poultry farmers 255	  
interviewed - all of which were backyard poultry farmers, would not report their suspicion to anyone. 256	  
Assuming this section of individuals did report to either the state veterinary service or a private 257	  
veterinarian, the sensitivity of the surveillance system would increase by 50% as shown in Table 7.  258	  
Discussion 259	  
HPAI is a highly lethal disease in chickens. Infected birds develop clinical signs and die within two to 260	  
three days (ESWI, 2012). With recognizable clinical signs shown in infected birds and a short incubation 261	  
period, early detection and reporting of suspected HPAI cases by poultry owners is likely to be the most 262	  
cost-effective means of surveillance. Passive surveillance has been reported to be more sensitive at 263	  
detecting HPAI than active surveillance (Honhold, 2007; Hadorn and Stärk, 2008; Alba et al, 2010).  264	  
4.1. Quantitative assessment of the sensitivity of passive surveillance. 265	  
At a design prevalence of 0.1% the model assumes 100% sensitivity. This high sensitivity can be 266	  
influenced by several factors one of which is the extremely large reference population size (Martin et al, 267	  
2007; Hadorn and Stark, 2008) which in this study is 170,899 poultry farms. The model assumes that the 268	  
entire chicken population is under surveillance, this is logical as we are dealing with passive surveillance 269	  
where voluntary reporting can be made by the entire population. However, regardless of a farmer’s 270	  
ability to recognise HPAI and his/her willingness to report, in Nigeria not all farmers are equally 271	  
predisposed to report as a result of; 272	  
i. Poverty which affects their ability to communicate suspicion due to lack of funds; 273	  
ii. Location in remote villages which affects their ability to access veterinary services; and  274	  
iii. Lack of mobile phone network in remote areas which hinges on communication 275	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According to IFAD (2013), 70% of Nigerians live below the poverty line and poverty is present mostly in 276	  
the rural areas where social services and infrastructure are limited. This in reality will affect the total 277	  
population under passive surveillance. Figure 3 shows how the sensitivity of passive surveillance varies 278	  
when 100% and 35% of the reference population is subject to surveillance. This shows the difference 279	  
between the ideal and the real sensitivity of passive surveillance for HPAI in Nigeria. 280	  
The sensitivity analysis indicates that backyard chicken farmers’ capability to recognise and report HPAI 281	  
is crucial in the detection process. Several factors were identified to have considerable impact on 282	  
farmers’ ability to recognise the disease.  These factors include firstly, farmers’ knowledge of the clinical 283	  
manifestation of the disease. Secondly, the poultry size was considered very important especially in 284	  
backyard poultry farms. Backyard poultry farms visited had a range of 300 – 6 chickens. In the situation 285	  
of poultry farms with eight birds or less, one or two dead birds may not trigger a farmer’s awareness of 286	  
HPAI as they may perceive the bird to have died of any other disease or of natural cause. Differentiating 287	  
accepted level of mortality from death due to HPAI becomes difficult. Lastly, taking into consideration 288	  
that the majority of backyard poultry in the state are allowed to scavenge for food and are confined 289	  
mostly at night, food and water intake may not readily be monitored. Though backyard poultry farmers 290	  
have the opportunity for day by day observation of their individual birds, there is a need for further 291	  
studies to establish how efficiently backyard poultry farmers are to detect HPAI H5N1 in a free range or 292	  
scavenging system.  293	  
Backyard poultry farmers’ willingness to report suspected cases is crucial. This is determined by how 294	  
enlightened they are about the disease, its seriousness – economic and public health implications - and 295	  
the level of compensation paid for culled birds (Hadorn and Stark, 2008). Of 13 backyard poultry farmers 296	  
interviewed, six would sell-off and/or consume any of their birds they suspected to be sick. This practice 297	  
is dangerous and could lead to the emergence and spread of human cases of HPAI or other zoonotic 298	  
diseases. Further study is needed to estimate the factors that encourage this behaviour and effective 299	  
measures to stop it. The revising of the compensation payment scheme for culled birds to a more 300	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acceptable amount by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) significantly improved the number of 301	  
cases reported in commercial poultry farms during the outbreak between 2006 and 2008 (Akinwumi et al, 302	  
2010). In the absence of financial support for the compensation of culled birds by the World Bank, it is 303	  
necessary that the FGN maintains this scheme in order to motivate poultry farmers to report HPAI. 304	  
4.2. Potential areas for improvement to the surveillance system. 305	  
The current case definition for HPAI as stated by the Federal Department of Livestock and Pest Control 306	  
Services (FDLPCS) is directed towards veterinarians, stating under what conditions HPAI should be 307	  
suspected (FDLPCS, 2006). There are no such guidelines stating the conditions under which poultry 308	  
farmers should report to or consult a veterinarian. Farmers need to know what to report and this should 309	  
be appropriately and accurately communicated to them. For instance, education campaigns aimed at 310	  
improving small scale poultry farmers’ knowledge in Indonesia was used to improve their ability to 311	  
recognise HPAI (FAO, 2009). There is need to tailor the case definition to suit small farms in order to 312	  
optimize early detection in backyard farms. 313	  
The field manual that guides government veterinarians in the collection of specimen states that samples 314	  
should be collected from six birds with an equal number of dead and sick birds. However there are some 315	  
backyard poultry farms with less than six birds. Under such circumstance the government should revise 316	  
the collection of specimen to be taken from across other backyard farms in close proximity and with 317	  
possible contact to the suspected farm within a given locality.  318	  
Six out of 26 poultry farmers interviewed reported to consulting an informal poultry health adviser and 319	  
not either the private or public veterinary service when they have problems with their birds. The reasons 320	  
for this appear to be the cost of bringing a highly trained person to their flock versus a local, less highly 321	  
qualified person. Governments need to think how to identify these informal animal health providers and 322	  
incorporate them into the system of surveillance rather than getting everyone to report to qualified vets. 323	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The result of the STM emphasizes the importance of backyard poultry farms in the HPAI passive 324	  
surveillance because of their extensive farming throughout the country. Backyard farming practises are 325	  
vulnerable to HPAI infection (Biswas et al, 2009) and pose a risk of HPAI transmission to humans 326	  
through contact with infected birds (Bridges et al, 2002; Dinh et al, 2006; Mounts et al, 1999). However, 327	  
during the 2006 – 2008 HPAI H5N1outbreaks in Nigeria the federal government has been criticized for 328	  
concentrating compensation payment to large scale commercial poultry farmers, disregarding backyard 329	  
poultry farmers to experience losses with no financial support (Akinwumi, 2010; IRIN, 2010, 330	  
Uzochukwu-Obi et al, 2008). This lack of compensation could greatly discourage them from reporting 331	  
and ultimately decrease the surveillance system sensitivity. 332	  
The consumption and selling of sick birds by bird owners in Nigeria is a practice that has been reported 333	  
by several authors and was also observed during our field study (Uzochukwu-Obi et al, 2008; Otte et al, 334	  
2008; Akinwumi et al, 2010). Consumption of sick birds may limit the spread of the disease and mask the 335	  
true size of an outbreak but it has serious potential health implications. Selling sick birds is very 336	  
important in the spread of the disease. The government should take these aspects into consideration for 337	  
developing a HPAI control strategy. 338	  
Some backyard poultry farmers interviewed confirmed that they had given drugs, mainly antibiotics 339	  
(tetracycline) and paracetamol to their sick birds. Veterinary doctors interviewed mentioned that most 340	  
poultry farmers would consult them for help in situations where they could not manage on their own or 341	  
when a large amount of birds die. This practise of self-medicating birds delays the timeliness of detecting 342	  
a case in the passive surveillance and should therefore be discouraged in order to improve the overall 343	  
efficiency of the system.  344	  
Overall, the larger the percentage of the population involved in passive surveillance, the more sensitive 345	  
the system will be. Creating better access roads; providing efficient mobile communication channels; and 346	  
improving the general standard of living are issues that should be prioritized by the government. These 347	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have benefits not only for disease surveillance but also in matters of health, security, social and economic 348	  
development.  349	  
4.3. Limitations and assumptions. 350	  
The time gap between infection and detection may cause disease spreading to other locations. Bird 351	  
movements to and from LBM have been reported as important places in the spread and circulation of 352	  
HPAI H5N1 (Kung et al, 2007; Sims, L. 2007).The model does not take into account the time elapsed 353	  
between infection or the manifestation of clinical signs and reporting to the concerned authorities. This 354	  
window period is crucial for the spreading of the infection in a system where free range backyard poultry 355	  
rearing thrives. 356	  
At the time of this research there was no up-to-date census on Nigerian poultry. Data of poultry 357	  
population used here were extrapolated from several sources including the National Bureau of Statistics 358	  
(NBS) 2007 estimates, Adene and Oguntade, (2008) and FAO, (2008). 359	  
Estimates of the sensitivity of the surveillance are influenced by the value of the relative risk. Due to lack 360	  
of up-to-date poultry census (population at risk) and lack of complete data of disease outbreaks available, 361	  
expert opinion was used in estimating the relative risk of HPAI used in the model. There was some level 362	  
of uncertainty in the results obtained. In order to reduce uncertainty, experts with over 15 years’ 363	  
experience and from relevant fields were selected for the survey. Also some input values used in model 364	  
parameters were derived from a field study which consisted of interviewing 26 farmers, two 365	  
veterinarians, and two informal poultry health advisers. Due to lack of up-to-date registered list of 366	  
poultry farms and list of veterinarians, it is difficult to conduct a random-based survey to obtain 367	  
representative data. Nevertheless, the STM developed here can be updated when new information 368	  
becomes available. 369	  
Conclusion 370	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This study has evaluated the sensitivity of passive surveillance for HPAI among chicken farms in 371	  
Bayelsa State using scenario tree methodology described by Martin et al, (2007). The model estimated a 372	  
high sensitivity of passive surveillance to detect the disease at low disease prevalence (0.1%). Its 373	  
sensitivity reduced to 50% assuming a minimum of ten infected farms were present in the state. The 374	  
probability of detecting HPAI can be improved by educating backyard poultry farmers on how to identify 375	  
the disease and encouraging them to report suspected cases. Other responsive participants such as 376	  
informal poultry health advisors should be more accountable in ensuring HPAI detection as they act 377	  
passively with farmers. It is perceived that the FGN reviews its compensation strategy to include 378	  
enhanced remuneration for backyard poultry farmers to encourage the disclosure of affected birds. 379	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Figure 1; Map of Nigeria showing the six geopolitical zones (Ekong et al, 2012) 497	  
498	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 499	  
Figure 2.STM describing the process of detection of HPAI by the passive surveillance. Only the branch 500	  
of backyard chicken is represented suggesting that the other category follows the same process. The same 501	  
is the case for the detection category nodes502	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  503	  
Figure 3. Chart showing the changes in sensitivity of passive surveillance for HPAI when 100% and 504	  
35% of the reference population is under surveillance. 505	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Table 1. Interview questions to farmers and veterinarians to define parameters associated with detection 507	  
by the passive surveillance. 508	  
Interview questions addressed to poultry keepers 
• What type of birds do you currently have on your premises and what is their total number? 
• For how long have you been keeping poultry? 
• What do you feed your birds 
• What are the common signs of illness in your poultry? 
• What poultry disease are you most concerned about? 
• Do you administer any form of drugs to your birds? 
• When you notice a sick bird, what do you do? 
• Who do you contact if a considerable amount of your birds were to fall ill 
• What is your acceptable level of mortality? 
• Who do you contact if a large amount of your birds were to die within a relatively short period? 
• At what point would you seek veterinary advice? 
Interview questions addressed to private veterinarians 
• For how long have you been practicing in Bayelsa state? 
• What are the most common poultry diseases you have encountered throughout your stay in the 
state? 
• What poultry disease have you never come across 
• At what point do you think poultry keepers would consult a Veterinarian for help concerning their 
birds? 
• What diagnostic tools are available to you? 
• Under what conditions would you suspect HPAI in a poultry flock? 
• What do you do upon suspicion? 
• At what point would the state veterinary service be notified? 
509	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Table 2. A description of the STM, showing the nodes, selected branches, input name, input 510	  
values/probability distributions and range of values used and their respective data sources. 511	  
Nodes Type Branches Input 
name 
Input value Data source 
Flock type Risk 
category 
Commercial 
chicken 
Backyard chicken 
RRCC 
RRBC 
1 
Pert (4.25, 5.25, 8.0) 
Expert opinion 
Flock status Infection Infected 
Not infected 
P*H 0.1%; 10 farms;  3 farms Author 
Clinical signs Detection Displaying  
Not displaying  
CS 0.9 Author 
Recognition of 
clinical signs 
Detection Recognized 
Not recognized 
RG 0.8 (Commercial flocks) 
Pert (0.1, 0.5, 1.0) Backyard 
flocks 
Author 
Farmer consults 
private vet 
Detection Yes 
No 
FCpV 0.231 - Commercial flock 
0.0385- Backyard flocks 
Field study; 
Interviews 
Farmer consults an 
informal poultry 
health advisor 
Detection Yes 
No 
FCQ 0.0385 - Commercial flocks 
0.192- Backyard flocks 
Field study; 
Interviews 
Farmer reports to 
government 
Detection Yes 
No 
FCG 0.231 - Commercial flocks 
0.0385- Backyard flocks 
Field study; 
Interviews 
Farmer consults no 
one 
Detection   0.231-Backyard flocks 
0.0-     Commercial flocks 
Field study; 
interviews  
Private Vet reports 
to government vet 
 
Detection Yes 
No 
pVR 1 FDLPCS, 2006 
Informal poultry 
health adviser 
report to 
government vet 
Detection Yes 
No 
QR Pert  (0.5, 0.6, 1.0) Field study 
interviews 
Vet takes samples Detection Yes 
No 
VS Pert (0.8, 0.86, 0.97) Expert opinion 
Lab performs test 
for AI 
Detection Tested 
Not tested 
LT Pert (0.89, 0.93, 0,99) Expert opinion 
RT-PCR test Detection Positive 
Negative 
SePCR Pert (0.80, 0.85, 0.95) Alba et al. (2010)  
Virus isolation  Detection Positive 
Negative 
SeVI Pert (0.95, 0.99, 1.0) Expert Opinion: 
512	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Table 3 Expert opinion elicitation results on the relative risk of infection between commercial and 513	  
backyard poultry farms, the probability that the vet will take samples and the laboratory will perform 514	  
tests (minimum, most likely, maximum) 515	  
Node Expert I Expert II Expert III Expert IV Average 
Vet takes samples (0.5,0.7,0.9) (0.8,1.0,1.0) (0.8,0.8,1.0) (0.95,0.95,1.0) (0.8, 0.86, 0.97) 
NVRI Lab Performs tests (1.0,1.0,1.0) (0.8,1.0,1.0) (0.8 0.81.0) (0.95,0.95,0.95) (0.89,0.93,0.99) 
Sensitivity of Virus Isolation (0.95, 0.97, 1) (0.95, 0.98, 1) (0.95, 0,99, 1) (0.95, 1.0, 1.0) (0.95, 0.99, 1.0) 
RR of infection between 
commercial &backyard 
poultry farms 
(3, 6, 10) (4, 5, 8) (5, 5, 8) (5, 5, 6) (4.25, 5.25, 8) 
 516	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Table 4 Response to questions on farmers’ action following the recognition of clinical signs for HPAI 518	  
H5N1 519	  
Farm Type Number interviewed Farmer’s action Numbers responding Proportion of total 
interviewed 
Backyard chicken 13 Call private vet 1 0.0385 
  Call government vet 1 0.0385 
  Call a informal poultry 
health advisor 
5 0.192 
  Call no one 6 0.231 
Commercial chicken  13 Call private vet 6 0.231 
  Call government vet 6 0.231 
  Call a informal poultry 
health advisor 
1 0.0385 
  Call no one 0 0 
Total 26  26 1 
Total 26  26 1 
 520	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Table 5 Median sensitivity of passive surveillance for HPAI in chickens assuming the entire chicken 522	  
population is under surveillance (P*H  = 0.5%, 0.1%, 10 infected and 3 infected poultry farms) 523	  
Design Prevalence P*H Median, 5 and 95 percentiles Se 
HPAI 
P*H = 0.1% 1.00 (1.00 – 1.00) 
P*H = 10 infected farms 0.50 (0.28 – 0.67) 
P*H = 3 infected farms 0.19 (0.09 – 0.29) 
 524	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Table 6 Median sensitivity of passive surveillance for HPAI in chickens assuming 35% of the reference 526	  
population is under surveillance (P*H  = 0.5%, 0.1%, 10 infected and 3 infected poultry farms) 527	  
Design Prevalence P*H Median, 5 and 95 percentiles Se 
HPAI 
P*H = 0.1% 0.98 (0.86 – 1.00) 
P*H = 10 infected farms 0.22 (0.11 – 0.32) 
P*H = 3 infected farms 0.07 (0.04 – 0.11) 
 528	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Table 7 Median sensitivity of passive surveillance for HPAI in chickens assuming 23% of backyard 530	  
farmers who do not report their suspicion report to either a private vet or the state veterinary service (P*H  531	  
= 0.5%, 0.1%, 10 infected and 3 infected poultry farms) 532	  
Design Prevalence P*H Median, 5 and 95 percentiles Se 
HPAI 
P*H = 0.1% 1.00 (1.00 – 1.00) 
P*H = 10 infected farms 0.78 (0.51 – 0.91) 
P*H = 3 infected farms 0.36(0.19 – 0.51) 
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